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INTRODUCTION 
Refugees and internally displaced persons [“IDPs”] are hardly a 
new phenomenon for Iraq. Under Saddam Hussein’s long and brutal 
rule forced displacement was a deliberate state policy.1 The 
government used expulsions as a tool to subdue recalcitrant 
populations and punish political opponents. The two main victims of 
this displacement were the Kurds, Iraq’s largest minority group 
which staged repeated rebellions, and the Shi’a majority, many of 
whom opposed the regime, including hundreds of thousands of 
Marsh Arabs.2 The government also used expulsions to take over 
fertile and oil-rich land. From the Kirkuk region, Saddam Hussein 
uprooted more than 100,000 Kurds and also members of the smaller 
Turkmen and Assyrian (Christian) minorities in an effort to 
‘Arabize’ the area. In all, when the United States invaded in 2003 
close to one million people were internally displaced in Iraq.3 
Another one to two million Iraqis lived abroad fearing persecution 
should they return. In fact, Iraq was one of the largest refugee-
producing countries in the world prior to the U.S. entry on the 
scene.4
 1. ROBERTA COHEN & JOHN FAWCETT, BROOKINGS INST., THE INTERNALLY 
DISPLACED PEOPLE OF IRAQ (2002), available at http://www.brookings.edu/papers/ 
2002/1120iraq_cohen.aspx (estimating that as a result of the displacement policy 
more than one million people remain forcibly displaced in Iraq today). 
 2. Id. 
 3. See id. (breaking down the total number of displaced to include 600,000 to 
800,000 in northern Iraq and 300,000 in southern and central Iraq); see also JOHN 
FAWCETT & VICTOR TANNER, BROOKINGS INST., THE INTERNALLY DISPLACED 
PEOPLE OF IRAQ 1 (2002), available at http://www.brookings.edu/fp/projects/IDP/ 
articles/iraqreport.pdf (recognizing that little attention was paid to the displaced 
despite substantial international humanitarian efforts). 
 4. See U.S. COMMITTEE FOR REFUGEES, WORLD REFUGEE SURVEY 2000 185 
(Immigration and Refugee Services of America 2000) (ranking Iraq third on a list 
of countries that have produced the greatest numbers of refugees and asylum 
seekers, with 568,000 people formally qualifying for refugee or asylum status and 
an estimated one to two million Iraqis living abroad with a well-founded fear of 
persecution in Iraq); see also U.S. COMMITTEE FOR REFUGEES, WORLD REFUGEE 
SURVEY 2002 170 (Immigration and Refugee Services of America 2002) (ranking 
Iraq ninth on a list of countries that have produced the greatest numbers of 
refugees and asylum seekers, with 300,000 people formally qualifying for refugee 
or asylum status and an estimated one to two million Iraqis living abroad with a 
well-founded fear of persecution in Iraq). 
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The U.S. invasion and the toppling of Saddam Hussein, far from 
resolving the problem, however, made it worse.  It catapulted the 
country into a near civil war between Shi’a, who had largely been 
excluded by Saddam Hussein’s regime, and Sunnis who until then 
had dominated the government.5 The combination of intense and 
bloody sectarian violence, coalition military action, fighting among 
Shi’a militias and between the government and the Mahdi army, and 
generalized violence and criminality caused massive uprooting. In 
2007, some 60,000 Iraqis were reported to be fleeing their homes 
each month.6 New displacement diminished sharply in 2008 as 
overall security improved in Iraq.7 But together with those who had 
been displaced earlier, some fifteen to twenty percent of the Iraqi 
population—or 4.7 million people out of a total population of 27 
million—remained displaced. Of this total, 2.7 million (ten percent 
of Iraq’s population) are inside the country while some 2 million 
more are abroad, mostly in neighboring countries.8
 5. See, e.g., Michael Howard, Iraq Slips Toward Civil War After Attack on 
Shi’a Shrine, THE GUARDIAN, Feb. 23, 2006, available at http://www.guardian. 
co.uk/world/2006/feb/23/iraq.iraqtimeline1/print (recognizing the near civil war 
that resulted from retaliatory attacks by Sunni and Shi’a Muslims on holy sites 
following the changing power dynamics caused by the U.S. invasion). 
 6. Andrew Harper, Where to Now? Decreasing Options for Displaced Iraqis, 
MIGRATION INFORMATION SOURCE, Sept. 2007, http://www.migrationinformation. 
org/Feature/display.cfm?id=644 (noting Iraqi Red Crescent Organization estimates 
that the monthly displacement figure is actually closer to 100,000). 
 7. See IDP WORKING GROUP, INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS IN IRAQ: 
UPDATE, Mar. 24 2008, www.reliefweb.int/rw/RWFiles2008.nsf/FilesByRWDoc 
UnidFilename/SHIG-7D6DBL-full_report.pdf/$File/full_report.pdf (recognizing 
that the rate of displacement has been significantly lower in 2008 but secondary 
displacement, particularly in Baghdad, has increased). 
 8. See IOM Emergency Needs Assessments, IOM BI-WEEKLY REPORT 
(International Organization For Migration, Geneva, Switzerland), Mar. 15, 2008, at 
1, available at http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/RWFiles2008.nsf/FilesByRWDoc 
UnidFilename/LSGZ-7J4BDV-full_report.pdf/$File/full_report.pdf (estimating the 
number of displaced within Iraq since February 2006 as 1,596,448 and the number 
earlier displaced within Iraq as 1,212,108, a total of 2.8 million internally 
displaced);  see also Statistics on Displaced Iraqis Around the World, U. N. High 
Commissioner for Refugees, Sept. 2007, available at http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-
bin/texis/vtx/home/opendoc.pdf?tbl= SUBSITES&id=470387fc2 (last visited Sept. 
16, 2008) (estimating 500,000-700,000 refugees in Jordan, and 1.4 million in 
Syria); Kenneth H. Bacon & Kristele Younes, Op-Ed, Outside and Inside Iraq’s 
Border, a Forgotten Exodus, WASH. POST, Jan. 20, 2008 (setting forth the number 
of refugees in the Gulf States, including 130,000 in Egypt, 50,000 in Lebanon, and 
57,000 in Iran); Iraqi Refugees: Can the U.S. Do More to Help?: Written 
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Today’s displaced Iraqis are not viewed as sympathetically around 
the world as those persecuted and uprooted by Saddam Hussein.9 
One reason is that they are seen as a problem largely of the United 
States’ making and one that the United States should therefore “fix.” 
America’s failure to establish security in the country after its 
invasion or to prepare effectively for the country’s reconstruction is 
considered a major reason for the chaos and violence that caused the 
mass displacement. As a result, many donor governments have been 
reluctant to fully share the burden of Iraq’s displaced, believing the 
United States should foot most of the bill together with the 
government of Iraq, which over the past year has been able to 
accumulate considerable oil wealth. Nor have they been overly 
forthcoming in resettling Iraqi refugees or in offering funds to the 
governments of Jordan and Syria, which house most of the 
refugees.10
Statement Before the H. Comm. on Foreign Affairs, Subcomm. on International 
Organizations, Human Rights, and Oversight and the Subcomm. on Middle East 
and South Asia, 110th Cong. (2008) (written statement of L. Craig Johnstone, 
Deputy High Commissioner, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees), 
available at http://foreignaffairs.house.gov/110/joh022608.htm (stating that the 
level of displacement has stabilized and the overall rate of displacement has 
decreased).  But see FAFO, IRAQIS IN JORDAN 2007: THEIR NUMBERS AND 
CHARACTERISTICS 3, http://www.fafo.no/ais/middeast/jordan/IJ.pdf (concluding, 
despite contrary reports, that only 450,000-500,000 Iraqis have fled to Jordan, 
perhaps indicating that the governments concerned have provided inflated figures 
to the international community). 
 9. See No-Fly Zones: The Legal Position, BBC NEWS, Feb. 19, 2001, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/1175950.stm (last visited Sept. 26, 2008) 
(pointing out that the United States and its allies, for example, set up a no fly zone 
at the end of the Gulf War in 1991 to protect displaced Kurds from Saddam 
Hussein’s wrath); see also GlobalSecurity.org, Operation Pacific Haven Wraps up 
Humanitarian Efforts, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/pacific_ 
haven.htm (last visited Sept. 16, 2008) (describing a military operation in 1996-97 
during which the U.S. rescued approximately 6,500 Kurds from northern Iraq). 
 10. But see KELLY O’DONNELL & KATHLEEN NEWLAND, MIGRATION POLICY 
INST., THE IRAQI REFUGEE CRISIS: THE NEED FOR ACTION 22 (2008), available at 
http://www.migrationpolicy.org/pubs/MPI-The_Iraqi_Refugee_Crisis_The_Need_ 
for_Action_011808.pdf (demonstrating that Sweden has been an exception, and 
anticipates taking in more than 25,000 refugees in 2006-2007, significantly more 
than its EU counterparts).  See also id. (noting that from 2006-June 2007, Greece, 
the Netherlands, Germany and the UK took in more refugees than the United 
States, with numbers reaching 4,900; 3,327; 2,882; and 1,970 respectively as 
compared to 910 for the United States). 
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The Iraqi government’s attitude toward its displaced population 
has contributed to this international unwillingness to extend needed 
support. Even though Iraq’s budget surplus from oil revenues is 
projected to be $79 billion by the end of 2008, the Shi’a-dominated 
government of Nuri Kamal al-Maliki has delivered only minimal 
amounts of funding to neighboring states for the refugees.11 Some 
believe it is because many of the refugees are Sunni and Christian or 
because the refugees humiliated the government by departing. Still 
others argue that support for the refugees will discourage their 
returning home. Nor has the government been forthcoming with 
support for its internally displaced population, again dampening 
other countries’ willingness to contribute. 
The U.S. government’s fear of terrorism after September 11 has 
also cast a shadow of suspicion over Iraq’s displaced. Alarm bells are 
constantly raised that some Iraqi refugees could be associated with 
terror cells, and others could become potential terrorists if they 
remain displaced for long periods without assistance.12 Although the 
U. N. High Commissioner for Refugees (“UNHCR”) has identified 
up to 100,000 vulnerable Iraqis for resettlement, the Department of 
Homeland Security (“DHS”) has subjected them to such intense 
screening that resettlement has been excruciatingly slow and the 
number admitted small—some 12,000 who fled since 2003, with 
 11. See Walter Pincus, Iraq’s Slow Refugee Funding has Ripple Effect; U.N. 
Says It May Scale Back Its Effort; Some Nations Have Withheld Payments, WASH. 
POST, May 17, 2008, at A12 (underscoring that many donor countries have 
withheld funding for refugees as a result of the Iraqi government’s meager efforts, 
providing only fifteen million dollars to Syria, two million dollars to Lebanon, and 
eight million dollars to Jordan); James Glanz & Campbell Robertson, As Iraq 
Surplus Rises, Little Goes Into Rebuilding, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 6, 2008, at A1 
(describing the expected windfall to the Iraqi government resulting from increased 
oil prices). 
 12. See DANIEL L. BYMAN & KENNETH M. POLLACK, BROOKINGS INST., 
ANALYSIS PAPER NO 11: THINGS FALL APART: CONTAINING THE SPILLOVER FROM 
AN IRAQI CIVIL WAR 5 (2007), available at http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/ 
Files/rc/papers/2007/01iraq_byman.pdf (recognizing that refugee camps are often 
breeding grounds for militia groups, regardless of whether they are under 
international control); see also Interview with Amelia Templeton, Refugee Policy 
Analyst, Human Rights First, by e-mail (Mar. 3, 2008) (explaining that the 
Department of Homeland Security has expressed the fear that “terrorists will seek 
to infiltrate” the resettlement program if procedures are weakened and large 
numbers are put in the pipeline). 
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most admitted in 2008.13 The extensive delay even prompted the 
U.S. Ambassador to Iraq to complain to Washington about the failure 
to expedite resettlement for the Iraqis who are at risk because they 
worked for the U.S. government.14 By contrast, the victims of 
Saddam Hussein have fared much better in gaining admission to the 
United States; in the past, roughly 37,000 Iraqi refugees fleeing that 
regime resettled in the United States.15
Neighboring states, which to their credit have taken in up to two 
million Iraqis, also share fears that the refugees could bring their 
home grown ethnic and religious struggles to their countries of 
asylum. In November 2005, three Iraqi nationals recruited by al-
Qaeda entered Jordan and blew themselves up at Amman hotels 
killing sixty people.16 Although this violent incident did not involve 
the “refugees” per se, Jordan subsequently began barring entry of 
Iraqi men from the ages of eighteen to thirty-five, and there have 
been repeated warnings that large numbers of Iraqi refugees could 
represent a security threat to the region.17 Some argue that displaced 
 13. Walter Pincus, U.S. to Admit 17,000 Iraqi Exiles, WASH. POST, Sept. 14, 
2008, at A12. 
 14. See Spencer S. Hsu & Robin Wright, Crocker Blasts Refugee Process, 
WASH. POST, Sept. 17, 2007, at A1 (noting that “thousands of desperate Iraqis who 
have worked alongside Americans now find themselves the targets of insurgents 
and sectarian militias”). In FY 2007, the United States issued special immigrant 
visas for translators and interpreters to 429 Iraqi principal applicants plus their 
family members, and in FY 2008 issued visas to 318 principal applicants plus their 
family members as of April. Fact Sheet, U.S. Dep’t of State, Office of the 
Spokesman, U.S. Humanitarian Assistance for Refugees and Internally Displaced 
Iraqis (Apr. 15, 2008), http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2008/apr/103623.htm 
[hereinafter Dep’t of State Fact Sheet] (announcing further that new legislation 
would increase the number of visas available to Iraqis in immediate danger to 
5,000 but that processing procedures for such visas remained unfinished). 
 15. Lawrence E. Bartlett, U.S. Dep’t of State, Bureau of Population, Refugees, 
and Migration, Statement at Georgetown University Panel Discussion on Iraq: The 
Human Cost of War (Mar. 21, 2007) [hereinafter Bartlett Statement] (claiming an 
upcoming expansion of the U.S. resettlement program to make up for the disparity 
between the Iraqis admitted from the mid-1970s through 2003, roughly 37,000, 
and from 2003-2007, 692). 
 16. Nir Rosen, Iraq’s Jordanian Jihadis, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 19, 2006 
(magazine), at 54 (noting that non-Jordanians were used in the attack to avoid 
infiltration by Jordanian intelligence authorities). 
 17. Thanassis Cambanis, Exodus from Iraq Unsettles Mideast, THE BOSTON 
GLOBE, Dec. 3, 2006, at A1 (describing the results of Jordan’s change of policy, in 
particular the roundup and subsequent deportation of Iraqi men). 
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men and women, desperate for funds, could easily fall prey to 
militant groups. In fact, the Iraqi refugee situation is often compared 
to the worst refugee case studies (e.g., Afghanistan) in which 
refugees paid and armed by third parties undertook jihad against 
their countries. 18
The Palestinian refugee problem has further affected how Iraqi 
refugees are viewed and at times has undermined a willingness to 
help the them. For sixty years, Arab countries have borne the brunt 
of the Palestinian refugee crisis and are therefore mindful of the 
consequences of accepting large numbers of refugees for long 
periods. One Middle East specialist, when speaking of Jordan, 
commented that “[a]dding another large refugee population could 
seriously undermine the viability of a key U.S. ally in the Middle 
East.”19 Although both Jordan and Syria have been widely 
commended for admitting large numbers of Iraqis, Jordan began to 
restrict entry at the end of 2006 and Syria began to restrict entry in 
the fall of 2007.20 It is feared that the two governments could in time 
deport the refugees back to Iraq or make life so untenable for them 
that they will have no choice but to return. By now, eight to twelve 
percent of the populations of Jordan and Syria are Iraqis.21
Particularly unacceptable to both governments is the entry of Iraqi 
Palestinians. Jordan, already seventy percent Palestinian because of 
the Palestinian influxes of 1948 and 1967, has refused entry to Iraqi 
Palestinians, while Syria since 2006 has sought to bar their entry as 
 18. BYMAN & POLLACK, supra note 12, at 55-58 (describing the birth of the 
Taliban and al-Qaeda from Afghan refugees living in Pakistan). 
 19. Interview with David A. Korn, retired, State Department, in Wash., D.C. 
(Jan. 24, 2008). 
 20. See Cambanis, supra note 17 (detailing Jordan’s policies cutting back the 
number of Iraqi refugees permitted to enter the state); see also PATRICIA WEISS 
FAGEN, IRAQI REFUGEES: SEEKING STABILITY IN SYRIA AND JORDAN 21 (2007), 
available at http://isim.georgetown.edu/Publications/atPubs/Iraqi%20Refugees.pdf 
(noting that while Syria has not closed its border with Iraq, it will implement new 
regulations governing entry and limiting the number of visas granted to certain 
groups of individuals). 
 21. See Bacon & Younes, supra note 8 (indicating that the influx of Iraqi 
refugees into Jordan is the second refugee crisis Jordan has faced and the resultant 
fears of the Jordanian kingdom of a “protracted refugee crisis”); Syria: Warning of 
Looming Crisis as Iraqi Refugee Influx Continues, IRIN, http://www.irinnews.org/ 
report.aspx?ReportId=72967 (warning of the potential social and economic crisis 
that may result from Syria’s burgeoning Iraqi refugee population). 
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well.22 After considerable negotiations, Syria did allow into a camp 
in its northeast those stranded on the Iraqi-Jordanian border, but 
other Palestinians were denied entry and remain in Al Tanf, a camp 
in a no-man’s land between Syria and Iraq, as well as in a camp on 
the Iraqi side of the border.23 Syria has now begun to deport 
hundreds of Iraqi Palestinians to Al Tanf.24
The perilous situation faced by more than four million displaced 
Iraqis is sometimes presented as a temporary problem, especially 
when filtered through the positive political prism of the Bush 
Administration. The return of tens of thousands of refugees since 
mid-2007 has been cited as evidence of an improved security 
environment, made possible by ‘the surge’ (the addition of 30,000 
U.S. troops to the 130,000 already there).25 But when analyzing the 
returns more closely, UNHCR found that most of the refugees 
returned because their resources or visas ran out in Syria and 
Jordan.26  Moreover, many of those who returned could not reclaim 
 22. See Eric Londoño, Iceland Takes Palestinians Leaving Iraq, WASH. POST, 
Sept. 9, 2008, at A15 (noting that the Syrian and Jordanian governments have 
turned Palestinian refugees away “out of concern that thousands would follow”). 
 23. ASHRAF AL-KHALIDI, SOPHIA HOFFMAN & VICTOR TANNER, BROOKINGS 
INST., IRAQI REFUGEES IN THE SYRIAN ARAB REPUBLIC: A FIELD-BASED 
SNAPSHOT 14-15 (2007), available at http://www3.brookings.edu/fp/projects/idp/ 
200706iraq.pdf (noting that Palestinian refugees were allowed into Syria as part of 
a convoy organized by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and 
the UN Relief and Works Agency). 
 24. Interview with anonymous UNHCR Official, by e-mail (Feb. 29, 2008). 
 25. See Syria: Not Safe Enough for Iraqi Refugees to Return – UNHCR Chief, 
IRIN, Feb. 14, 2008, http://www.irinnews.org/report.aspx?ReportID=76738 
[hereinafter Syria: Not Safe] (providing conflicting accounts of security in Iraq 
coming from the Iraqi government and the UN High Commissioner for Refugees); 
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Iraq Government Busses 
Refugees Home from Syria, UNHCR, Feb. 14, 2008, http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/ 
texis/vtx/iraq?page=news&id=474d996c4 (quoting Iraqi officials crediting the 
American troop surge with improved security in Baghdad). 
 26. See Iraq-Jordan: Few Iraqis Returning Home, IRIN, Dec. 9, 2007, 
http://www.irinnews.org/report.aspx?ReportID=75771 (contrasting the opinions of 
Iraqi government officials that the return of refugees from Syria is the result of 
improved security with that of aid agencies who claim that the return is the result 
of increasingly inhospitable conditions in Syria, including stricter immigration 
rules and financial considerations); Iraq-Syria: Starving to Survive: Iraqi Refugees 
Resort to Desperate Measures, IRIN, Jan. 2, 2008, http://www.irinnews.org/ 
Report.aspx?ReportId=76062 (discussing the unsavory practices in which Iraqi 
refugees have felt compelled to engage, including prolonged fasting and 
prostitution, because they cannot otherwise afford to survive). 
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their homes for security reasons or found them damaged beyond 
repair. Nor could they find jobs or basic services. Some returned to 
Syria, while most others became displaced inside the country.27 Iraqi 
government authorities have acknowledged that they do not have 
sufficient capacity for handling returning refugees.28 One Middle 
East expert claimed that “[i]t would not be surprising if, 20 years 
from now, millions of Iraqis still lived outside their home country.”29
Taking into account the unique situation in which Iraq’s refugees 
and IDPs find themselves, this article examines the problems facing 
the displaced, the different solutions being proposed and possible 
ways forward. 
I.  THE REFUGEE CRISIS 
The flight across borders of some two million Iraqis, especially in 
2006-07, has been described as “the world’s fastest growing 
displacement crisis”30 and the largest in the Middle East since the 
Palestinian exodus. It is estimated that there are about 1 million Iraqi 
refugees in Syria, 500,000 to 700,000 in Jordan and more than 
400,000 in other neighboring countries.31 By the end of 2006, the 
 
 27. Interview with anonymous UNHCR Official, by e-mail (Jan. 28, 2008). 
 28. See Abed Al-Samad Rahman Sultan, An Unenviable Task, FORCED 
MIGRATION REV., June 2007, at 16 (expressing an urgent need for technical and 
financial assistance to enable the Iraqi Ministry of Displacement and Migration to 
adequately discharge its duties); see also Iraq: Parliament Committee Demands 
Fixed Budget to Aid the Displaced, IRIN, Feb. 10, 2008, http://www.irinnews.org/ 
report.aspx?ReportId=76662 [hereinafter Parliament Committee Demands Fixed 
Budget] (underscoring the urgent need for a complete policy and budget to assist 
displaced Iraqis); Iraq: More Government Money for IDP’s, Refugees, IRIN, Feb. 
14, 2008, http://www.irinnews.org/report.aspx?ReportId=76734 [hereinafter More 
Government Money] (discussing the Iraqi Parliament’s proposal that between three 
and five percent of national oil revenues be devoted to the problem of displaced 
families). 
 29. Daniel Byman, The Next Phase of the Iraq War, SLATE, Nov. 15, 2007, 
http://www.slate.com/id/2178065/. 
 30. See generally KRISTELE YOUNES, REFUGEES INT’L, THE WORLD’S FASTEST 
GROWING DISPLACEMENT CRISIS (Mar. 2007), http://www.refugees 
international.org/content/issue/detail/9915 (outlining the problems faced by 
displaced persons inside Iraq and providing recommendations to improve the 
situation). 
 31. See Bacon & Younes, supra note 8 (recognizing that refugees have flocked 
to the major cities in the region, making it harder for them to be distinguished). 
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high numbers caused Jordan to close its doors while Syria in the fall 
of 2007 imposed visa restrictions to reduce the refugee flow.32
In neither Syria nor Jordan do refugees have a clear legal status. 
Neither government is party to the 1951 Convention Relating to the 
Status of Refugees (“Refugee Convention”),33 nor does either 
recognize the rights to which refugees are entitled or the obligations 
signatory states have toward those in their territory. While both 
initially welcomed the refugees, their non-recognition of the Refugee 
Convention is now putting many of these same people in jeopardy, 
especially in Syria. The Refugee Convention, for example, provides 
that refugees have the right to work, including self-employment, and 
with treatment equal to the most favorable accorded to foreign 
nationals, but in Syria, where the refugees are considered tourists or 
guests, they are not officially allowed to work.34 Although some 
specialized professionals, such as teachers and doctors, have been 
issued work permits, many work illegally or are unemployed as a 
result of Syrian policies.35 Unable to support themselves and their 
families, and with depleted financial reserves, hundreds are now 
leaving each day.36 The Refugee Convention further provides that 
 32. See id. (reporting that the ability of Iraq's neighbors to handle such large 
numbers is close to breaking point, that Jordan estimates the cost of the Iraqi 
refugees within its territory to be one billion dollars a year; and that although Syria 
boasts the largest number of Iraqi refugees, visa restrictions imposed in October 
2007 made it more difficult for Iraqis to enter Syria); see also Cambanis, supra 
note 17 (recognizing Jordan’s wariness of sectarian strife spreading from Iraq as 
one of the reasons for the restrictions). 
 33. See States Party to the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees 
and the 1967 Protocol, http://www.unhcr.org/protect/PROTECTION/3b73b0d63 
.pdf (last visited Nov. 12, 2008) (setting forth the 144 nations party to the 
Convention). 
 34. See U.N. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 
arts. 17, 189 U.N.T.S. 150 [hereinafter Refugee Convention] (stipulating that 
signatory states must protect refugees’ rights to seek wage-earning employment 
within a state territory on a level equal to the most favorable treatment accorded 
nationals of a foreign country). 
 35. See O’DONNELL & NEWLAND, supra note 10, at 13 (noting that the 
passports of Iraqi refugees are stamped upon entry into Syria, barring them from 
working). 
 36. Interview with anonymous UNHCR official, by e-mail (Feb. 29, 2008); see 
also Syria: Not Safe, supra note 25 (noting that, though the figure is disputed, the 
Iraqi Red Crescent has reported that nearly 45,000 Iraqis returned to Iraq in the 
four month period from September 2007 to December 2007). 
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refugee children shall enjoy elementary education just as nationals 
do.37 Although Iraqis have free access to schools in Syria, in 2007, 
statistics show that enrollment in Syrian schools is a mere “35,000 
out of an estimated 250,000 school-aged Iraqi children,” and many 
Iraqi families could not afford the required uniforms and school 
supplies.38  Access to adequate health care is also limited even 
though Iraqis are provided with emergency medical and primary 
health care. Thirty-six percent of refugees registered with UNHCR in 
Syria had special medical needs.39
In Jordan, the refugees are in a precarious situation. Following the 
2005 suicide bombings in Amman by Iraqi nationals, the government 
began to restrict entry and by 2007 had largely closed its doors, also 
rounding up and deporting some Iraqis. Treated as guests or 
sometimes as illegal immigrants, most Iraqis have been denied the 
right to work: “in May 2007, only [twenty-two] percent of Iraqi 
adults were employed.”40 Only one-fifth of school-age refugee 
children were in public schools although all Iraqi children were 
theoretically given access to public education.41 Refugees were able 
to access emergency treatment in public hospitals, but to receive 
continued treatment, they had to be residents.42  
 37. See Refugee Convention, supra note 33, art. 37 (“The Contracting States 
shall accord to refugees the same treatment as is accorded to nationals with respect 
to elementary education.”). 
 38. See O’DONNELL & NEWLAND, supra note 10, at 13 (recognizing that many 
Iraqi refugee families are forced to choose between “sending their children to 
school or to work”); Interview with anonymous UNHCR official, supra note 36; 
AL-KHALIDI, HOFFMAN & TANNER, supra note 23, at 33-34 (recognizing that 
schools may turn children away if they fail to produce the required 
documentation). 
 39. Ron Redmond, UNHCR Spokesperson, Statement at Press Briefing on 
Iraq: Pressure on Safe Havens Inside and Outside Fuels Fears of Increased Internal 
Displacement (Oct. 23, 2007), available at http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/ 
iraq?page=briefing&id=471dc5653 (categorizing the special needs as including 
medical, children and women at risk, the elderly, and the disabled). 
 40. See O’DONNELL & NEWLAND, supra note 10, at 15 (noting the resentment 
among Jordanians caused by the influx of Iraqi refugees, which decreased wages 
throughout Jordan). 
 41. See Presbyterian Church in Canada, Iraq: Assistance Needed for Internally 
Displaced People and Refugees, PWS&D NEWSWIRE, Jan. 23, 2008, 
http://www.presbyterian.ca/node/2557 (suggesting that this statistic is an 
improvement on past numbers of Iraqi children attending school in Jordan). 
 42. See AMNESTY INT’L, MILLION IN FLIGHT: IRAQI REFUGEE CRISIS 23 (Sept. 
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While Iraqi refugees have provided some benefits to their host 
countries (purchase of goods and services, additions to the job 
market), rising inflation and deteriorating economic conditions in 
Jordan and Syria have provided fertile ground for economic 
resentments to surface against them, overriding initial feelings of 
“Arab solidarity.” Schools and health services have become more 
crowded and apartments more scarce. Jordanians in particular have 
begun to blame Iraqis for a deteriorating quality of life due to higher 
prices, increasingly unavailable and expensive housing, inflation, and 
increased traffic and crime.43 In Syria, many blame the refugees for 
the rise in unemployment, the higher cost of food, fuel and water, 
strains on electricity, and in particular, rent increases. As a result of 
the Iraqi influx, Syria’s government has had to spend more for public 
services and subsidies of goods such as bread, fuel, municipal water 
and electricity.44
It is unlikely therefore that Jordan or Syria will accommodate a 
long-term presence of Iraqis. Neither country has developed a plan to 
integrate Iraqi refugees. This makes return to Iraq the only serious 
option, even though most do not want to return45 and the likelihood 
2007), http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/MDE14/041/2007/en/dom-MDE14 
0412007en.pdf (recognizing that private hospitals generally do not have residency 
requirements, but are often too expensive for Iraqi refugees). 
 43. See FAGEN, supra note 20, at 12 (underscoring that although the Jordanian 
government has worked to manage the strain on public services created by Iraqi 
refugees through public subsidies and additional personnel, it has been unable to 
keep up with the increased demand); see also Robert F. Worth, Rising Inflation 
Prompts Unease in Middle East, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 25, 2008, at A1 (illustrating the 
inability of the Jordanian government to maintain public subsidy programs and the 
impact of the removal of a subsidy on fuel on the cost of food). 
 44. See IRAQI REFUGEES IN THE SYRIAN ARAB REPUBLIC, supra note 23, at 41 
(reporting that, according to the Syrian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the influx of 
Iraqi refugees caused “[t]he demand for bread [to rise] 35 percent, costing the state 
$34 million,” and the increased demand for water cost Syria roughly $7 million); 
see also ELIZABETH FERRIS & MATTHEW HALL, BROOKINGS INST., UPDATE ON 
HUMANITARIAN ISSUES AND POLITICS IN IRAQ 8 (July 6, 2006), available at 
http://www3.brookings.edu/fp/projects/idp/20070706.pdf (underscoring the 
increased costs to the Syrian government of public schooling and state subsidized 
goods resulting from the Iraqi refugee population); Andrew Harper, Iraq: Growing 
Needs Amid Continuing Displacement, FORCED MIGRATION REV., Dec. 2007, at 53 
(noting that increased demand has overcome the ability of the Syrian government 
to meet the demand for electricity). 
 45. See Iraq: UNHCR Concerned About Funding for Refugees, IDPs, IRIN, 
Apr. 30, 2008, http://www.irinnews.org/report.aspx?ReportID=77990 [hereinafter 
COHEN_TO PRINT.DOC 1/22/2009  6:03:45 PM 
2008] IRAQ’S DISPLACED 313 
 
of their finding resettlement in the industrialized countries is small.46 
For the time being, the security situation in Iraq is still sufficiently 
uncertain that the UNHCR has not revised the requests it made to the 
governments of Jordan and Syria to refrain from forcibly deporting 
refugees back to Iraq.47 Among the groups unlikely to return are 
religious minorities subject to persecution, in particular Christians 
(representing some fifteen to twenty percent of the registered 
refugees).48 Yet for Jordan and Syria to host many refugees for 
extended stays, they will need considerable international help.  But 
even with more help, the governments in the region might not agree 
to accept long-term strains on their infrastructure and societies. 
A. TERRORISTS OR VICTIMS? 
Fears are often expressed that without adequate assistance the 
refugees in Syria and Jordan could become a source of terrorism and 
violence in the region. Iraqi specialist Daniel Byman, for example, 
has warned that the Iraqi refugee crisis could destabilize an already 
volatile Middle East.49 Humanitarian advocates regularly bolster 
their arguments for providing aid to the refugees by pointing out the 
UNHCR Concerned] (highlighting a UNHCR survey that found that only four 
percent of the Syrian refugees surveyed plan to return to Iraq). 
 46. See O’DONNELL & NEWLAND, supra note 10, at 22-23 (recognizing that 
Iraqis seeking asylum in industrialized nations are constrained by the cost of 
traveling and the restrictive policies in industrialized nations, including visa and 
passport restrictions requiring refugees to acquire a passport in Baghdad). 
 47. See Syria: Not Safe, supra note 25 (highlighting comments made by UN 
High Commissioner for Refugees Antonio Guterres that Iraq remained too unstable 
to support returning refugees and Syria’s subsequent pledge not to forcibly deport 
Iraqi refugees); see also Jordan’s King Meets Guterres, Pledges Continued 
Hosting of Iraqis, DEUTSCHE PRESSE-AGENTUR (Hamburg, Germany), Feb. 12, 
2008 [hereinafter King Meets Guterres] (emphasizing King Abdullah II of Jordan’s 
commitment to supporting Iraqi refugees until the security situation in Iraq 
stabilized). 
 48. See Lourdes Garcia-Navarro, All Things Considered: Archbishop’s Slaying 
Rocks Iraq’s Christian Minority (NPR radio broadcast, Mar. 13, 2008), available 
at http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=88200212&ft=1&f=1001 
(noting that despite not being involved in the conflict in Iraq, the Christian 
minority were targets of the violence and were portrayed as allies of American 
forces). 
 49. See Byman, supra note 29 (recognizing the impact of the Palestinian 
refugee crisis on the wars between Israel and its neighbors and cautioning that a 
similar outcome may result from a failure to address the Iraqi refugee crisis). 
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security consequences of not providing aid. As Elizabeth Ferris of 
the Brookings Institution warns, “[i]f the refugees do not receive 
sufficient support from the host governments and the international 
community, there is a very real danger that political actors will seek 
to fill the gap.”50 Similarly, a UNHCR official pointed out that the 
state security agencies in Jordan and Syria “are aware that Iraqis are 
changing the character of their societies and fear that their presence 
may ignite sectarian and ethnic conflict.”51 Given the explosive 
environment in the Middle East, such concerns bear heeding. The 
presence of more than half a million Iraqis in Jordan, a country of 
only six million people, could well have consequences for its 
domestic politics and security. Although most of the refugees are 
Sunni, roughly one quarter are Shi’a and some have been moving 
into militant neighborhoods.52  In the case of Syria, “numerous 
sources confirm that both Sunni and Shi’a radical armed groups have 
people” in that country, with the Sunni Ba’athist resistance having 
the strongest presence.53 An increasing number of “politically active, 
Islamist-oriented Iraqis” could pose a threat to the government’s 
secular rule.54
At the same time, it bears emphasizing that most refugees in Syria 
and Jordan have been the victims of violence and threats, not the 
 50. ELIZABETH FERRIS, BROOKINGS INST., SECURITY, DISPLACEMENT AND 
IRAQ: A DEADLY COMBINATION 17 (Aug. 27, 2007), available at 
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/rc/papers/2007/0827humanrights_ferris/2
0070827.pdf. 
 51. Harper, supra note 44, at 53. 
 52. See id. at 52-53 (noting that Shi’ites constitute less than twenty-five percent 
of Iraqi refugees in Syria and Jordan, while more than fifty percent are Sunnis); see 
also FERRIS, supra note 50, at 13 (highlighting reports of local NGOs that Iraqi 
refugees are increasingly moving into the Zarqa neighborhood of Amman, which is 
known to Jordanian media as “a cradle of Islamic militancy” and is the hometown 
of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the leader of al Qaeda in Iraq). 
 53. See AL-KHALIDI, HOFFMAN & TANNER, supra note 23, at 15 (noting that the 
presence of the Ba’athist resistance is widely acknowledged, from the U.S. 
government to the Arab media). 
 54. See FERRIS, supra note 50, at 15 (recognizing the historical security 
concern of the Syrian government with the growth of political Islam, including the 
use of military force to expel the Muslim Brotherhood from the state in 1982); see 
also Nir Rosen, The Flight From Iraq, N.Y. TIMES, May 13, 2007 (magazine), at 
40 (recognizing that Syria has balanced its relationship with sectarian groups, but 
this balance may soon become untenable and may threaten the stability of the 
state). 
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perpetrators.55 Further, it is not clear that those who had radical ties 
in Iraq will remain part of those organizations once out of the 
country. What might have been essential for survival in Iraq need not 
be continued in Jordan or Syria, so the argument that the refugees are 
potential security risks to their host countries must be carefully 
weighed against other factors: 
• The refugees are not in camps, but dispersed in urban areas, 
mixed in with the general population where it would be far 
more difficult to militarize and manipulate their members.56 
• In a country like Syria, the police apparatus is so controlling 
that it is unlikely that terrorist plots could be easily hatched. In 
Jordan, King Abdullah II has publicly warned that “we will 
never allow Jordan to become a staging ground for initiating 
problems within Iraq.”57 
• The profile of the refugees is markedly different from that of 
refugee populations where violence and jihad became a serious 
issue. The mujahadeen from Afghanistan and the Hutu 
genocidaires from Rwanda, often cited as precedents, were 
imbued with the desire to overthrow or undermine the 
governments left behind (e.g., the Soviet dominated regime in 
Kabul and the Tutsi dominated government in Kigali).58 The 
Iraqi refugees, by contrast, are mostly middle class and urban 
professionals who fled sectarian and generalized violence.59  
 55. See AL-KHALIDI, HOFFMAN & TANNER, supra note 23, at 15-16 
(recognizing that although there are Iraqi radical groups operating among Iraqi 
refugees in Syria, the majority of Iraqi refugees, both in Syria and in the other 
refugee-accepting states, are victims of the conflict). 
 56. See FERRIS, supra note 50, at 20 (noting that funding education and 
avoiding the creation of refugee camps ensures “alternative activities for young 
people who might otherwise turn to crime or militias”). 
 57. Interview by Asharq Al Aswat with King Abdullah II of Jordan, in Jordan 
(Jan. 23, 2007), available at http://www.jordanembassyus.org/hmka01232007.htm. 
 58. See Byman & Pollack, supra note 12, at 5-6 (discussing the origins of the 
mujahadeen from Afghanistan and the Hutu genocidaires from Rwanda and how 
these movements came to fruition from refugee crises); see generally STEPHEN 
JOHN STEDMAN & FRED TANNER, BROOKINGS INST., REFUGEE MANIPULATION: 
WAR, POLITICS, AND THE ABUSE OF HUMAN SUFFERING 57-134 (2003) (detailing 
how the motivations of the refugees and the support of the international 
community and the host state contributed to the militarization of refugees and 
continued violence in their home state). 
 59. See AL-KHALIDI, HOFFMAN & TANNER, supra note 23, at 45 (noting that 
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While many do not identify with the “new Iraq,” which since 
their departure has become more conservative, less secular, and 
dominated by Shi’a with ties to Iran, they do not fit the profile 
of people seeking to overthrow their government.  In fact the 
profile of the refugees points more to a serious brain drain for 
Iraq than an insurgent threat. Since 2003, “[forty] percent of the 
country’s professional class has left the country,” including a 
disproportionate number of people with managerial and 
administrative backgrounds and fifty percent of its 34,000 
medical doctors, while the number of teachers in Baghdad has 
fallen by eighty percent.60 “Whereas less than [one percent] of 
Iraqis had a postgraduate education, nearly [ten percent] of 
refugees in Syria had advanced degrees, including [four and a 
half percent] with doctorates.”61 To be sure, since 2006, less 
affluent and educated Iraqis have also fled to Syria and Jordan, 
but according to one study, the influx has not produced the kind 
of “generalized poverty, misery or despair among the Iraqi 
refugees” that could lead to jihad and violence.62 According to 
a U.N. official who served in the area, refugees needing to 
 
146 of 192 Iraqi refugees interviewed were from the middle class). 
 60. See Elizabeth Ferris, Address: Iraq’s Displacement Crisis and International 
Response (Dec. 6, 2007), available at http://www.brookings.edu/speeches/ 
2007/1206_iraq_ferris.aspx?p=1 (noting that the professional class “are most likely 
to have the means, will, and capabilities to remain outside their country”); see also 
Elizabeth Ferris, Address: Humanitarian Issues and Politics in Iraq (Feb. 14, 2007), 
available at http://www3.brookings.edu/fp/projects/idp/20070706.pdf 
(underscoring that the loss of such professionals will result in problems with 
reconstruction); News Release, World Health Organization, Violence Threatens 
Health in Iraq (Apr. 17, 2007), available at http://www.who.int/mediacentre/ 
news/releases/2007/pr15/en/index.html (noting that the “government estimates that 
almost 70% of critically injured patients with violence-related wounds die while in 
emergency and intensive care units due to a shortage of competent staff and a lack 
of drugs and equipment”). 
 61. Michael Schwartz, Iraq’s Tidal Wave of Misery: The First History of the 
Planet’s Worst Refugee Crisis, TOMDISPATCH.COM (2008), http://www.tom 
dispatch.com/post/174892. 
 62. See AL-KHALIDI, HOFFMAN & TANNER, supra note 23, at 44-45 (noting that 
only 10% of the Iraqis interviewed were poor, but that percentage could rapidly 
change without international recognition of the problem of Iraqi refugees). 
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support themselves and their families have become “far more 
vulnerable to prostitution than to terrorism.”63
B.  THE U.S. ROLE 
Many have looked to the United States to play the principal role in 
resolving the Iraq refugee problem. However, at a public forum at 
Georgetown University in March 2007, a representative of the State 
Department refused to acknowledge any special responsibility in this 
case.64 In testimony before Congress in January 2007, Ellen 
Sauerbrey, then the Assistant Secretary of State for Population, 
Refugees and Migration, stated that the Iraqi refugees had become a 
“very top priority” for the United States, but expressed little urgency 
about expediting refugee resettlement.65 As former U.S. Ambassador 
to the U.N. John Bolton explained it, sectarian violence, not 
American actions, created the refugee problem so it was therefore 
not the United States’ responsibility: “Our obligation . . . was to give 
them new institutions and provide security. We have fulfilled that 
obligation. I don’t think we have an obligation to compensate for the 
hardships of war.”66
Pressure from members of Congress, humanitarian and human 
rights NGOs, and the public has produced pledges by the Bush 
Administration to speed up resettlement. In fiscal year (“FY”) 2006 
(October 1, 2005 to September 30, 2006), only 202 Iraqis were 
admitted, and in FY 2007 (October 1, 2006 to September 30, 2007), 
1,608, and most of these were backlogged cases of Iraqis who had 
fled the Saddam Hussein regime. It was not until May 2007 that 
 63. Interview with anonymous UN official, in Washington, D.C. (Jan. 19, 
2008); see Katherine Zoepf, Iraqi Refugees, in Desperation, Turn to the Sex Trade 
in Syria, N.Y. TIMES, May 29, 2007, at A1 (describing women who engage in 
prostitution to support their families). 
 64. See Bartlett, supra note 15 (in the question period he said that the U.S. did 
not distinguish between the Iraqi refugees and other refugee caseloads). 
 65. See Rachel L. Swarns, Senators Denounce Bush Policy Limiting Refuge for 
Iraqis, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 17, 2007, at A8 (blaming the time-consuming process of 
determining who is a refugee as a reason for the slow process of refugee 
resettlement); see also Kelley Beaucar Vlahos, Iraq Translators Face Closed Door 
U.S. Immigration Policy, FOX NEWS, Feb. 7, 2007, http://www.foxnews.com/ 
story/0,2933,250595,00.html (noting that the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad is unable 
to handle the number of applications for resettlement it receives). 
 66. Rosen, supra note 54, at 74, 78. 
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refugees who fled post-war Iraq began to enter the United States. In 
FY 2008 (October 1, 2007 to September 30, 2008) the United States 
admitted 12,000 Iraqis, largely in response to the adoption by 
Congress of the “Refugee Crisis in Iraq Act,” which seeks to 
expedite the entry into the U.S. of Iraqi refugees.67 But to advocacy 
groups, the total falls “far short of needs.”68
The resources made available have also been limited. In FY 2006, 
the U.S. contributed $43 million for Iraqi refugees and IDPs, 
increasing this to $171 million in FY 2007, while the needs in Jordan 
and Syria were estimated at more than $2.6 billion.69 After members 
of Congress and NGOs urged the U.S. to fund at least fifty percent of 
UNHCR’s January 2008 appeal for $261 million, the United States 
increased its share to $95.4 million and added to its contributions to 
other international organizations, making for an overall total of $208 
million by April 2008.70  But this starkly contrasted with the $70 
billion the U.S. appropriated for the military effort in Iraq in FY2008 
 67. See O’DONNELL & NEWLAND, supra note 10, at 2, 19-20 (recognizing that 
the Act was an amendment to the Department of Defense Authorization Act passed 
by Congress in December 2007). 
 68. See Press Release, Refugees Int’l, U.S. Goals for Iraqi Refugees are 
Inadequate, Sept. 12, 2008 available at http://www.refugeesinternational.org/ 
press-room/press-release/release-us-goals-iraqi-refugees-are-inadequate. 
 69. See Dep’t of State Fact Sheet, supra note 14 (calculating the total funding 
that the United States spent on humanitarian assistance for refugees and IDPs in 
Iraq, as well as how much aid is allocated for international organizations and non-
governmental organizations); Bacon & Younes, supra note 8 (reporting that the 
U.N. estimated that the U.S. spent about $105 million in 2007 to accommodate 
Iraqi refugees while Jordon estimated that the cost of harboring Iraqi refugees is 
nearly $1 billion a year);  see also US Contributes More Than $125 Million to 
International Organizations to Aid Displaced Iraqis, STATES NEWS SERVICE, Feb. 
14, 2008 (reporting that the United States contributed $46 million in humanitarian 
aid for IDPs and refugees in Iraq in January of 2008 and an additional $125 million 
in February 2008). 
 70. See US Contributes More Than $125 Million, supra note 69 (providing an 
itemized list of international organizations that will receive the additional 
humanitarian aid from the U.S. for IDPs and refugees, including the UNHCR, the 
United Nations Children’s Fund, and the World Health Organization); Letter from 
Representative Alcee L. Hastings & Representative John D. Dingell to President 
George W. Bush (Jan. 22, 2008), available at http://www.csce.gov (follow 
“Newsroom” hyperlink; then follow “Press Releases” hyperlink; then browse 
Recent Press Releases for “January 2008”; then follow “Reps. Hastings and 
Dingell Urge Increased Funding for Iraqi Refugees” hyperlink) (communicating 
the Congressmen’s view that the United States should fund at least half of the 
UNHCR’s proposal for $261 million in refugee assistance). 
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and led members of Congress to call for more than $1 billion for 
Iraq’s refugees and IDPs in FY2009.71
As matters stand in the closing months of 2008, the United States 
can best help promote a solution to Iraq’s displacement crisis by 
taking the following steps: 
• Insist that the government of Iraq devote the resources and 
develop the plans for the safe and sustainable returns of the 
bulk of the refugees, and provide the training and guidance for 
it to do so. Although the government of Iraq has set aside funds 
to give free transportation and start-up money to returning 
families (a promise not always kept), and has been trying to 
promote the return of medical doctors, there appears to be no 
long-term planning or capacity to support those returning to 
Iraq.  In fact, the UN reports relatively small numbers trying to 
return.72 Some face threats and violence upon return, encounter 
problems in gaining access to basic services, and have to 
struggle to revive their livelihoods or find new sources of 
income.73 
• Press the government of Iraq to adequately compensate 
neighboring states for sheltering Iraqi refugees beyond the $25 
million given in 2008. 
• Mobilize U.S. and international resources to adequately help 
the refugees and ensure that Jordan, Syria, and other 
 71. See Hastings & Dingell, supra note 70 (declaring that underfunding the 
humanitarian crisis in Iraq is both a moral failure of the United States and a 
security threat). 
 72. See UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSION FOR REFUGEES, UNHCR GLOBAL 
REPORT 2007 306 (2008), available at http://www.unhcr.org/home/PUBL/ 
484908962.pdf (stating that the absence of security and essential services in Iraq 
prevented UNHCR from promoting “repatriation” in 2007, although repatriation is 
helping a limited number of Iraqis). 
 73. See Press Release, International Organization for Migration, Tent Camp 
Assessment Reveals Grim Reality in Iraq (Aug. 15, 2008), available at 
http://www.iom.int/jahia/Jahia/pbnAF/cache/offonce?entryId=18137 [hereinafter 
IOM Press Release] (describing deplorable health conditions and cultural factors 
that discourage Iraqis from choosing to live in tent camps); UNHCR Concerned, 
supra note 45 (providing UNHCR survey results that found that although many 
refugees may have contact with people still living in Iraq, they are unlikely to 
return permanently because of the general violence or because their homes, work 
and/or families were destroyed). 
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neighboring states receive the assistance needed for assuming 
the lion’s share of the burden. 
• Press Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the other Gulf States to admit 
refugees and to provide financial aid to Jordan and Syria. 
• Work with Syria and Jordan to develop plans for the integration 
of those who can not, or choose not to, return home, with 
special attention paid to educational and employment 
opportunities. 
• Take in greater numbers of refugees to the United States, 
including more Iraqis who worked for the Unites States, and 
urge other states to increase the refugee numbers they admit. 
One reason the Bush Administration has failed to do more to help 
Iraq’s refugees is that doing so would require an implicit admission 
that its policies have not produced peace and stability in Iraq but 
rather a refugee crisis. A change in administration will therefore 
doubtless be needed before a more constructive policy can be 
adopted. As a Presidential Candidate, Barack Obama expressed 
support for a large increase in humanitarian aid for the refugees to 
total $2 billion but has not yet provided many policy details.74 Some 
experts have proposed a massive resettlement program modeled after 
the one that brought hundreds of thousands of Vietnamese to the 
United States.75 But this followed a defeat that no U.S. 
administration may be ready to acknowledge in Iraq. Although 
UNHCR has identified up to 100,000 Iraqis in pressing need of 
resettlement (they can neither remain safely in their host countries 
nor return safely to Iraq), leading Republican members of Congress 
have taken the position that “the last thing we want to do is to have 
people who are friendly to democracy . . . moving here in large 
numbers at a time when they’re needed to build a new, thriving Iraq
 74. See Barack Obama, War in Iraq, http://www.barackobama.com/issues/iraq/ 
(last visited Sept. 16, 2008) (expressing Obama’s support for preventing a 
humanitarian crisis by contributing to neighboring countries, assisting the 
resettlement of IDPs, and prosecuting war crimes). 
 75. But see FAGEN, supra note 20, at 23-24 (noting that states in Southeast Asia 
were largely unwilling to host the refugees and pressed for resettlement, which 
contributed to the U.S. commitment to this option); see, e.g., Byman, supra note 29 
(comparing the Iraqi refugee crisis to the refugee crisis following the 1948 Israeli 
war of independence). 
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. . . . Now is the time that we should be calling on the refugees from 
Iraq to go home.”76
For Iraqis at risk because they worked for the United States, 
attention has focused on Operation Pacific Haven, carried out by the 
Clinton Administration in 1996-97 to remove 6,600 Kurds from 
northern Iraq whose lives were in danger for having worked with the 
United States.77 The U.S. government successfully accelerated their 
screening and resettlement so that they could arrive (via Guam) in 90 
to 120 days.78 When the operation ended, the Department of Defense 
predicted that it would “undoubtedly be a role model for future 
humanitarian efforts.”79 To date, the Bush Administration has given 
no consideration to this option, but a future administration would do 
well to revisit the program. 
II. THE IDP PROBLEM 
The 2.7 million people internally displaced in Iraq serve as a 
constant reminder that the country, in many respects, is a 
dysfunctional state. The Iraqi government proved unable to prevent 
the forced displacement of people in Baghdad, its own capital, as 
well as in other urban centers. In fact, radical Sunni and Shi’a 
militias who drove the 2006-07 sectarian violence were tied to 
political parties, police and army units. The Ministry of the Interior is 
 76. Walter Pincus, House Panel Debates Iraq Refugee Quandary, WASH. POST, 
Mar. 17, 2008, at A15 (quoting Rep. Dana Rohrabacher, ranking minority member 
of the Subcommittee on International Organizations, Human Rights and Oversight 
of the House Foreign Affairs Committee). 
 77. See News Release, U.S. Dep’t of Defense, Office of the Assistant Secretary 
of Defense (Public Affairs), Operation Pacific Haven Wraps Up Humanitarian 
Efforts (Apr. 15, 1997), http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/release.aspx?releaseid 
=1218 (announcing the successful conclusion of a 218-day operation in which 
Kurdish evacuees were brought to Guam and provided with medical care and 
clothing to prepare them for assimilation into the United States). 
 78. See id. (comparing the expedited asylum procedure used for Kurdish 
evacuees to the typical asylum process, which can take from six months to two 
years per individual). 
 79. See id. (quoting Joint Task Force Operation Pacific Haven commander 
Major General John Dallager); see also George Packer, The Guam Option, THE 
NEW YORKER, Nov. 9, 2007, available at http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/ 
georgepacker/2007/11/the-guam-option.html (challenging the Bush Administration 
to copy the Kurdish relocation program despite the negative publicity that might 
arise). 
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still widely reported to be infiltrated by Shi’a militias, which 
assaulted and expelled people from their homes, sometimes in police 
uniforms.80 In such a political environment, it is not surprising that 
the government has failed to exhibit the will, resources or skills to 
deal with the needs of the displaced. In the Ministry of Displacement 
and Migration, it is not unusual to find staff that sees the displaced 
only from the perspective of their own ethnic or religious group.81
More than 1.5 million of Iraq’s IDPs were uprooted following the 
February 2006 bombing of the al-Aksari Shi’a shrine in Samarra.82 
Although the sectarian violence had started earlier, once Shi’a 
restraint ended, the violence accelerated and sectarian-induced 
displacement sharply overtook the displacement caused by military 
operations, generalized violence, and the expulsions from the 
Saddam Hussein period.83 Shi’a and Sunni militias systematically 
and purposefully began to intimidate, harass, kill and expel people of 
the opposite ethnicity from their neighborhoods in order to gain 
control over those areas and expand their power base. The result has 
been an Iraq increasingly fragmented along religious and ethnic 
lines, with segregated areas in Baghdad and other urban centers. 
 80. See ASHRAF AL-KHALIDI & VICTOR TANNER, BROOKINGS INST., 
SECTARIAN VIOLENCE: RADICAL GROUPS DRIVE INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT IN IRAQ 
13 (2006), available at http://www.brookings.edu/fp/projects/idp/20061018_ 
DisplacementinIraq_Khalidi-Tanner.pdf (discussing instances  of Shi’a militias 
operating in police uniforms and the police force’s inability to stop an attack on the 
Abu Hanifa mosque);  Solomon Moore, Ominous Signs Remain in City Run by 
Iraqis, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 23, 2008, at A1 (reporting that ethnic militia control 
police and incite ethnic violence even in homogeneous Iraqi cities, like Basra). 
 81. Interview with anonymous Ministry of Displacement and Migration staff, 
in Wash. D.C. (July 13, 2005). 
 82. See Patrick Cockburn, Iraq is Disintegrating as Ethnic Cleansing Takes 
Hold, THE INDEPENDENT, May 20, 2006, http://www.independent.co.uk/news/ 
world/middle-east/iraq-is-disintegrating-as-ethnic-cleansing-takes-hold-478937.ht 
ml (identifying the bombing of al-Aksari Shi’a shrine in Samarra as a major factor 
that edged Iraq closer to civil war and set off a wave of displacement as people fled 
from the violence). 
 83. See AL-KHALIDI & TANNER, supra note 80, at 7-8  (describing ruthless 
strategies employed by both Shi’a and Sunni radical groups, such as targeting 
youth, creating violence in mixed neighborhoods, and attacking the other’s 
mosques); INT’L ORG. FOR MIGRATION, IRAQ DISPLACEMENT 2007 YEAR IN 
REVIEW 1 (2007) [hereinafter IRAQ DISPLACEMENT 2007 YEAR IN REVIEW], 
http://www.iom.int/jahia/webdav/shared/shared/mainsite/media/docs/reports/2007_
year_in_review.pdf (highlighting the spike in displacement that occurred following 
the February 2006 Samarra bombing and subsequent violence). 
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Sunnis and Shi’a pushed from their homes have mostly gone to areas 
where their group is in the majority while Christians have fled to 
parts of Ninewah province and Kurds to the northern Kurdish 
areas.84
At least forty percent of those who fled do not expect to return85 
since their displacement reflects deep-seated political divisions 
within the country. Indeed, the brutality used in uprooting them was 
intended to ensure that they would not return to their home areas.86 
Many, in fact, sold their homes or abandoned their property when 
they fled, indicating that they do not plan to return.87 Given “the 
departure of entire families and, in some cases, communities,” 
internal displacement “is likely to be long-term.”88 The more 
prolonged it becomes, the less likely substantial returns will occur. 
Sizeable numbers of minority groups—Kurds, Christians, 
Sabeans, Turkmen, and Roma—as well as foreign nationals—
Palestinians and Sudanese—were also uprooted by the sectarian 
violence. These expulsions came in addition to Saddam Hussein’s 
earlier uprooting of more than 100,000 Kurds (and also Turkmen and 
 84. See AL-KHALIDI & TANNER, supra note 80, at 21-26 (explaining the 
displacement of religious and ethnic groups from regions where they are not a 
majority, as well as where they went); see Interview with anonymous UNHCR 
official, supra note 24 (noting that in 2008, UNHCR found increasing numbers of 
Christians who fled to Ninewah fleeing again, this time abroad in search of safety); 
see AL-KHALIDI & TANNER, supra note 80, at 21-26 (recognizing that of the 
estimated 1.5 million IDPs uprooted since the Samarra bombing, many (560,000) 
are in the center of the country in Baghdad governorate, twenty-seven percent in 
the south, and fifteen percent in the northern governorates). Of the estimated 
million displaced before 2006, fifty-three percent are in the north and thirty-three 
percent in the south.  Id. 
 85. See IRAQ DISPLACEMENT 2007 YEAR IN REVIEW, supra note 83, at 4, 7 
(reporting that twenty-two percent of IDPs plan to remain in their current location, 
while seventeen percent plan to resettle in a third location, and two percent are 
undecided if they are going to return, or settle elsewhere); Internal Displacement 
Update for Iraq, UNHCR, Apr. 1, 2008, http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-
bin/texis/vtx/iraq?page=briefing&id=47f20efd6  (finding that as of April 2008, 
some 6,000 IDP families returned (two percent of those uprooted since 2006), 
mostly to areas where their communities were in the majority). 
 86. See AL-KHALIDI & TANNER, supra note 80, at 12-15 (demonstrating that the 
ethnic cleansing is neither spontaneous nor popular but carefully calculated to 
achieve political ends). 
 87. See FERRIS & HALL, supra note 44, at 2-3. 
 88. Harper, supra note 44, at 51. 
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Assyrians) from Kirkuk and its surrounding areas in order to 
‘Arabize’ this highly fertile region, which contains from ten to 
twenty percent of Iraq’s oil reserves, To reverse this ethnic cleansing, 
Kurds after the 2003 war began to return and try to reclaim their 
homes and land, but many found these to be occupied by others and 
became internally displaced again. Soon thereafter, Kurdish 
authorities began to reestablish control over the region, and some 
100,000 Arabs fled or were pushed out by the Pesh Merga. 
Meanwhile, Kirkuk’s Turkmen look to Turkey to protect their 
interests there. Because of the intensity of competing claims, Kirkuk 
has become a tinderbox of potential conflict and displacement.89
Most of Iraq’s internally displaced persons, whether in the north, 
center or south, face extreme hardship, many with urgent needs for 
shelter, food, medicine, clean water, employment and basic 
security.90 The decrease in sectarian violence since the summer of 
2007 has reduced displacement but has not significantly improved 
conditions for the displaced.91 In fact, in August 2008, the 
International Organization of Migration (“IOM”) reported a 
“worsening” in the situation, estimating that more than seventy 
 89. See AL-KHALIDI & TANNER, supra note 80, at 23-25 (accounting for the 
displacement of Kurdish, Christian, and third-country nationals, particularly 
Palestinians and Sudanese, by Sunni and Shi’a radicals); HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH 
VOL. 16, NO. 4(E), CLAIMS IN CONFLICT: REVERSING ETHNIC CLEANSING IN 
NORTHERN IRAQ 2-4 (2004) (providing context to the conflict between the Kurds 
and Arabs over Kirkuk and Mosul, which has been ongoing since the 1930s and 
has been largely ignored by the United States in Iraq); Michael O’Hanlan & Omer 
Taspinar, Op-Ed., Time for Kurdish Realism, WASH. POST, Feb. 9, 2008, at A15 
(arguing that Kurds should promote regional stability in Iraq because sharing 
Kirkuk will better serve Kurdish, Iraqi, and American interests in the long-term); 
ELIZABETH FERRIS & KIMBERLY STOLZ, BROOKINGS INST., THE FUTURE OF 
KIRKUK: THE REFERENDUM AND ITS POTENTIAL IMPACT ON DISPLACEMENT 1 
(2008), available at http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/rc/papers/2008/0303 
_iraq_ferris/0303_iraq_ferris.pdf (recognizing the contentious nature of Kirkuk’s 
status and the potential for producing displacement). 
 90. See Sultan, supra note 28, at 17 (urging Iraqi refugees not to return to Iraq 
because internal aid distribution is so limited). 
 91. See IRAQ DISPLACEMENT 2007 YEAR IN REVIEW, supra note 83, at 4 
(noting that returning IDPs often are subject to violence and maltreatment). THE 
INTERNALLY DISPLACED PEOPLE IN IRAQ, IRAQI RED CRESCENT ORGANIZATION 
UPDATE 28 3 (2007), available at http://www.iraqredcrescent.org/IDP_28_ 
update_EN.pdf  (detailing the challenges faced by IDPs in acquiring healthcare, 
education, and affordable shelter). 
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percent of IDPs do not have regular access to food rations from the 
Public Distribution System; fourteen percent have no access to health 
care; thirty-three percent cannot obtain the medications they need; 
and thirty-one percent have found their property occupied by 
others.92  While the vast majority of IDPs stay with families and 
friends that support them or rent homes, their situation has become 
precarious as rents increase, jobs grow scarce, and their hosts begin 
to run out of resources. At least twenty percent of the displaced can 
now be found in abandoned buildings, military bases, schools, parks, 
cemeteries, and soccer fields. One to two percent reside in tented 
camps, which lack basic services and tend to be in remote areas.93 
Although most of Iraq’s eighteen governorates have set up camp 
areas for IDPs, by the beginning of 2008 they began to restrict the 
number coming into their areas. According to a UNHCR official, the 
displaced have been “left largely to fend for themselves.”94
A. NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE 
Thus far, the national government has not demonstrated that it has 
the skills, resources, or political will to take care of its displaced 
population or provide the security, access to basic services, and 
livelihoods needed for the return of large numbers to their homes. 
Government agencies have often been described as incompetent, 
negligent, corrupt, or sectarian in approach.95 The Iraqi Minister of 
 92. See IRAQ DISPLACEMENT 2007 YEAR IN REVIEW, supra note 83, at 6; see 
also IOM Press Release, supra note 73 (depicting the difficult life in tent camps 
due to a lack of basic services, unemployment, and overcrowding). 
 93. See Harper, supra note 44, at 51-52 (stating that the poor conditions in tent 
camps lead to violence, psychological stress, and, for children, malnutrition, and 
that though the percentage in actual tent camps is low, an additional twenty percent 
reside in collective settlements). 
 94. See id. at 53. 
 95. See Iraq: NGOs Urge Action on Displacement Crisis, IRIN, Aug. 13, 2008, 
http://www.irinnews.org/report.aspx?ReportId=79798 (recognizing the failure of 
the Iraqi government to address the needs of IDPs and refugees and calling for the 
strengthening of Iraqi institutions); Iraq: Government Negligent in Tackling 
Human Displacement, IRIN, May 13, 2008, http://www.irinnews.org/Report. 
aspx?ReportId=78172 [hereinafter Iraq Government Negligent] (reporting that the 
Iraqi government’s inability to solve the IDP crisis fuels militia membership and 
can lead to terrorist activity); Iraq: IDPs Demand Government Return Them Home, 
IRIN, June 15, 2008, http://www.irinnews.org/PrintReport.aspx?ReportId=78749 
(quoting the head of Iraq’s parliament’s Displacement and Migration Committee, 
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Displacement and Migration explained that “[o]ur ministry, unlike 
others established when the state of Iraq was founded, is without any 
administrative legacy or institutional knowledge in the field of 
migration and displacement.”96 He therefore has called for a local, 
regional and international response. In January 2008, the head of 
parliament’s displacement committee Abdul-Khaliq Zankana 
announced that the government would allocate additional funds for 
IDPs, but acknowledged that “a plan for using this money has not 
been drawn up yet.”97
Local authorities, neighborhoods and mosques have sometimes 
proven more effective in aid distribution although they can also be 
partisan and do not usually provide housing and jobs. Assisting these 
efforts at the community level have been local non-governmental 
organizations [“NGO”], like the Iraqi Red Crescent, which have 
provided assistance to large numbers of IDPs, but most have limited 
capacity, may suffer from mismanagement and have not been able to 
reach many of those in need because of lack of security. 
Filling the void left by the government have been radical sectarian 
Sunni and Shi’a groups (the largest being the movement affiliated 
with Moqtada al-Sadr). Indeed, a Feinstein International Center study 
found that, “[i]ncreasingly, Iraqis are looking to militias and ad hoc 
neighborhood organizations as their option of first resort when 
seeking protection and assistance.”98 Similarly, members of 
stating that the IDP crisis could go unsolved for another decade if the Iraqi 
government does not soon address it); KRISTELE YOUNES & NIR ROSEN, REFUGEES 
INTERNATIONAL, UPROOTED AND UNSTABLE: MEETING URGENT HUMANITARIAN 
NEEDS IN IRAQ 3, 6 (2008), http://www.refugeesinternational.org/content/ 
publication/detail/10570/ (blaming the Iraqi government’s inadequate response to 
the IDP crisis in part on the role that sectarian bias has in the distribution of aid). 
 96. Sultan, supra note 28, at 16-17. 
 97. See Parliament Allocates More Money for IDPs, IRIN, Jan. 24, 2008, 
http://www.irinnews.org/report.aspx?ReportId=76404 (comparing the diversity 
and gravity of tasks for which the Iraqi Ministry of Displacement and Migration is 
responsible to the scant resources made available to it); More Government Money, 
supra note 28 (reporting that in February 2008 the government earmarked $40 
million for IDPs and refugees). 
 98. GREG HANSEN, FEINSTEIN INT’L CENTER, COMING TO TERMS WITH THE 
HUMANITARIAN IMPERATIVE IN IRAQ 8 (2007), available at http://www.internal-
displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/(httpDocuments)./A070E41CF0D611D1C1
257292005AB87F/$file/pdf_HA2015_Iraq_Briefing_Paper.pdf; see YOUNES & 
ROSEN, supra note 95, at i, 2-4 (reporting that IDPs are joining militias to secure 
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Parliament have warned that continued inattention to the displaced 
could make them “easy prey to militias and armed gangs inside Iraq 
and possible recruits to intelligence services outside Iraq.”99
In July 2008, the government introduced a National Policy to 
Address Displacement100 at a two-day conference that brought 
together central and local government officials, U.N. agencies and 
national and international NGOs. It commits the government to assist 
and protect IDPs, as well as refugees who return, without 
discrimination and promises to mobilize the resources required and 
strengthen government offices to improve the national response.101 In 
particular, it promises to improve the access of the displaced to basic 
services, to help them find employment, to protect them from 
evictions and violence, to assist them reclaim their property, and to 
encourage reconciliation between the different ethnic and religious 
groups upon return.102 Much of the policy, however, is in the form of 
recommendations that will need to be carried out. While it marks an 
important first step toward addressing displacement, the capacity and 
will of the government to implement its provisions will need to be 
demonstrated. 
The international community has also been slow to recognize the 
humanitarian and security crisis inside Iraq. For years, the U.S. and 
Iraqi governments assumed that the domestic situation would 
stabilize and that the IDPs would return home. As a result, billions of 
dollars in international aid focused on recovery and development 
programs that couldn’t be implemented because of the violence. 
food, clothing and security). 
 99. Iraq Government Negligent, supra note 95. 
 100. See Press Release, Ministry of Displacement & Migration and United 
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Improving the Rights of the Displaced 
(July 8, 2008), available at http://www.uniraq.org/documents/Press%20release% 
20E%20UNHCR%208%20July%202008.pdf [hereinafter Ministry Press Release] 
(announcing the formation of the National Policy to Address Displacement, 
intended to serve as a tool to facilitate the return of Iraqi IDPs and refugees). 
 101. Id. (asserting that the National Policy to Address Displacement is striving 
to create a safe return for 240,000 displaced Iraqi families). 
 102. See id. (quoting Daniel Endres, a representative of UNHCR in Iraq, as 
stating, “[b]y adopting this National Policy the Government of Iraq makes it clear 
that it wants to strengthen the protection of and assistance to displaced persons, 
and it indicates its willingness to work towards durable solutions for the 
displaced”). 
COHEN_TO PRINT.DOC 1/22/2009  6:03:45 PM 
328 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. [24:301 
 
More recently, a reassessment of donor priorities and U.N. programs 
has begun to take place. 
Greater international humanitarian presence is one of the 
priorities. Unlike in most other crises, international humanitarian 
organizations and international NGOs do not operate directly on the 
ground in Iraq except in parts of the north. Since the 2003 bombing 
of the U.N. headquarters, most humanitarian organizations moved 
their international staff out of Baghdad to Amman where they have 
operated by “remote management.”103 In August 2007, the U.N. 
Security Council voted to expand the United Nations’ mandate and 
presence in the country.104 The U.N. Assistance Mission for Iraq is 
expected to work with the government in support of the delivery of 
humanitarian aid and to promote the safe and voluntary return of 
IDPs and refugees. 
The extent, however, to which the U.N. will be able to increase its 
humanitarian presence throughout Iraq is not yet known. The 
decrease in violence since the summer of 2007 has not ended 
security threats against humanitarian staff, especially U.N. staff, who 
are often perceived as being allied with coalition forces. For the 
International Organization for Migration, “Iraq continues to be one 
of the most dangerous places in the world for humanitarian agencies 
to work.” 105 Between March 2003 and late 2006, some eighty-one 
local and international humanitarian and human rights workers were 
 103. But see Cecile Pouilly, Difficult Delivery: The ‘remote management’ of aid 
in Iraq, Vol. 146, Issue 2, REFUGEES, Apr. 2007, at 14 (quoting a UN refugee 
agency Iraqi employee as stating, “[r]emote management is not an option.  It’s a 
one-way street . . . [w]e don’t have other options to choose from.”); YOUNES & 
ROSEN, supra note 95, at 8 (providing examples of UN agencies that have local 
staff throughout Iraq, such as UNICEF and the International Organization for 
Migration). 
 104. See S.C. Res. 1770, ¶¶ 1-2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1770 (Aug. 10, 2007) 
(declaring an extended mandate of twelve months in addition to other efforts 
intended to assist in reconciliation and reintegration efforts that foster an orderly 
return of Iraqi IDPs and refugees). 
 105. IRAQ DISPLACEMENT 2007 YEAR IN REVIEW, supra note 83, at 6; see Press 
Release, Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, UN Officials Call 
for Improved Security and Access to Reach Iraqis in Need (Apr. 4, 2008), 
available at http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/rwb.nsf/db900sid/LSGZ-7DDH6Y?Open 
Document (stressing the importance of increasing security to facilitate 
humanitarian aid to Iraqis who lack essential goods and services). 
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killed there.106 When U.N. Under-Secretary-General for 
Humanitarian Affairs John Holmes visited the area in April 2008, he 
did not go into Iraq for security reasons. At the same time, 
international agencies have begun to expand their staff on the 
ground.107 It is hoped they will find that direct cooperation with local 
leaders, local communities, and local NGOs will prove an important 
way of increasing assistance and protection for IDPs and reinforcing 
local capacity. 
B.  PROPOSED SOLUTIONS 
Several solutions have been proposed to help Iraq deal with the 
IDP problem.  These include creating camps or safe havens, carrying 
out population transfers, introducing property and compensation 
mechanisms, establishing a viable political system, and 
implementing the National Policy to Address Displacement. 
1. Camps or Safe Havens 
A solution put forward during the height of the sectarian violence 
was the creation of large scale IDP camps or safe havens to enhance 
access to the displaced, take the strain off host families and contain 
refugee flows.108 Camps, it was argued, could provide public services 
 106. See HANSEN, supra note 98, at 7 (recognizing that such deaths occurred 
despite a range of security strategies employed to protect aid workers). 
 107. See Tim Cocks, Foreign Aid Workers Start to Return Home, REUTERS, July 
31, 2008 (reporting that the World Health Organization “quietly redeployed 
expatriate workers to Iraq” in July 2008); Guterres Visits Iraq; Announces 
Strengthened UNHCR Presence, UNHCR, July 5, 2008, http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-
bin/texis/vtx/iraq?page=news&id=47b99cd54 (citing Guterres’s February 2008 
promise to boost UNHCR’s “Baghdad-based staff from two to five 
internationals”); Iraq: Q&A – A day in the Life of Our Man in Baghdad, UNHCR, 
July 4, 2008, http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/iraq?page=news&id= 
486e36fc4 (detailing the routine of UNHCR’s Iraq representative in Baghdad); 
Press Release, United Nations Security Council, United Nations “Doing its Best” 
in Iraq in Midst of Painful National Transition, Under-Secretary-General for 
Political Affairs Tells Security Council (Apr. 28, 2008), available at 
http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2008/sc9311.doc.htm (noting that overall UN 
staff—non-humanitarian and humanitarian—has increased in Baghdad’s Green 
Zone and Erbil to nearly 200 people). 
 108. See BYMAN & POLLACK, supra note 12, at 44-45 (presenting the 
establishment of safe havens or “catch basins” along the Iraqi border as a way to 
“prevent the flow of dangerous people” across the border). 
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to the displaced and a modicum of security. But many compelling 
reasons dictated against setting up camps and would do so in the 
future. Camps or safe havens in today’s Iraq could easily be taken 
over by one ethnic group or another and become targets of sectarian 
attack. Moreover, unless the camps became detention centers 
surrounded by troops or police, it would be difficult to protect the 
people inside. There is also the question of whose troops or police 
would do the protecting. The reliability of the army and the police in 
Iraq remains questionable, as there have been clear connections 
between these officers and the militias undertaking the sectarian 
cleansing. Camps could also become an easy source of recruitment 
for militias while their restrictions on human rights and freedom of 
movement would undermine IDP protection. Iraqis, moreover, 
strongly prefer to stay with extended families and friends, and only a 
small percentage inhabit camps. For these reasons, the 
Representative of the U.N. Secretary-General on the Human Rights 
of IDPs, Walter Kälin, called for camps to be used in Iraq as “a last 
resort.”109 He recommended alternative measures such as providing 
resources to families to allow them to construct additional rooms in 
their homes for the displaced or supporting communities to enable 
them to build housing for the displaced and expand public services 
for them.110
Special safe areas for Iraqi Christians have also been proposed. 
However, the recent attacks that have taken place against them have 
been within the area where Christians predominantly live (Ninveh 
province) and to where they fled to escape attacks in other parts of 
the country. It has further been suggested that a Christian semi-
autonomous province become part of the Kurdish region where 
Christians would presumably be better protected, but this could risk 
their becoming caught up in a conflict over territory between the 
Kurds and the Arab central government. Clearly needed is
 109. See Walter Kälin, A Tragedy of Increasing Proportions: Internal 
Displacement in Iraq, FORCED MIGRATION REV., June 2007, at 15 (noting the 
shortcomings of refugee camps, including expense, risk of increased sectarian 
violence, and inadequacy in upholding cultural traditions). 
 110. See id. (advocating allowing IDPs to live within existing communities in 
order to avoid the dangers associated with IDP camps). 
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responsible governmental protection of Christians and other 
minorities.111
2. Population Transfers. 
Another solution put forward at the height of the violence was 
organized population transfers so that Sunni, Shi’a and Kurds, with 
the help of the international community, could relocate, albeit 
voluntarily, to areas of the country where their ethnic group was in 
the majority. The population transfers were intended to accompany 
“a soft partition” of the country into Kurdish, Shi’a and Sunni 
areas.112 Not surprisingly, this solution proved distasteful to many 
because it put the international community in the position of 
facilitating ethnic cleansing and of promoting mass displacement. 
Historically, population transfers were viewed in a positive light as 
a means of lessening loss of life in communal conflicts, creating 
more cohesive societies, and promoting more stable border 
demarcations. Such exchanges were carried out after the first and 
second world wars and also on the Indian subcontinent in the late 
1940s. But as human rights expert Felice Gaer has noted, “[t]hese 
mass population exchanges came with tremendous costs.”113 Millions 
 111. Erica Goode & Suadad Al-Salhy, A Spate of Violence in Mosul Forces 
Iraqi Christians to Flee Their Former Homes, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 11, 2008, at A10. 
 112. Compare EDWARD P. JOSEPH & MICHAEL E. O’HANLON, BROOKINGS 
INST., THE CASE FOR SOFT PARTITION IN IRAQ 3 (2007), available at 
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/rc/papers/2007/06iraq_joseph/06iraq_jose
ph.pdf (suggesting that “the mass movement of populations is far preferable to 
insisting that people at risk stay put or return to their homes to prop up an illusion 
of political co-existence”), with Chaim Kaufmann, Separating Iraqis, Saving Iraq, 
85 FOREIGN AFF. 4, July/Aug. 2006, at 156-60 (arguing that any partition would 
only be “de facto, because many Shiite leaders still hope that a unified country can 
emerge, and no regime in the Middle East would tolerate” Kurdish independence). 
 113. See Internal Memorandum by Felice Gaer of the Jacob Blaustein Institute 
for the Advancement of Human Rights, Resolving Conflicts and Upholding 
Human Rights Principles: Population Exchanges (Feb. 15, 2007) (on file with 
author); see also Rama Lakshmi, India’s Survivors of Partition Begin to Break 
Long Silence, WASH. POST, Mar. 12, 2008, at A1 (noting that “[a]ccording to 
conservative estimates, about half a million Hindus and Muslims were slaughtered 
and 14 million displaced, and about 70,000 women were abducted and raped, 
leaving both countries with deep psychological and political scars”). Kenneth Hill 
et al. compiled an excellent study of the impact of partition. See generally Kenneth 
Hill et al., The Demographic Impact of Partition in the Punjab in 1947, 62 
POPULATION STUDIES 2 (2008) (concluding that “Partition-related population 
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of people were uprooted and persons became “dispossessed, and sent 
penniless and homeless on what, for many, were death 
marches.”114 Although billed as voluntary, they were not in fact 
because “[t]here was no individual buy-in, or consent, to the 
exchanges, and little in the way of compensation or restitution of 
property.”115
In the case of Iraq, population exchanges could easily turn into 
coerced actions, with transfers possibly leading to unemployment, 
homelessness, poverty, and vulnerability to violence. Nor would they 
be easy to accomplish in Iraq since thirty-five percent of marriages, 
at least in the past, were mixed and people of different ethnic and 
religious backgrounds were used to living and working together. 
Advocates of the idea have argued that population transfers, however 
painful, might be the only way to protect people from sectarian 
violence; moreover, if people asked to be relocated for protection, 
they should be helped.116 Others have countered that population 
transfers overlook the right of IDPs to return to their homes once the 
threat to their safety has ended. In fact, there is a growing 
international consensus that displaced people should have the option 
not only of resettlement but of return to reclaim their property and 
even their homes. Population transfers would remove this choice.117
In deciding the future status of Kirkuk, however, population 
transfers could become a part of the solution.118 The liabilities of the 
losses in the Punjab, either from deaths or unrecorded migration, were in the range 
of 2.3-3.2 million”). 
 114. See DAVID FROMKIN, KOSOVO CROSSING, 189-90 (Free Press 1999) 
(chronicling the population deportations in Eastern and Central Europe after World 
War II). 
 115. Gaer, supra note 113. 
 116. Samantha Power, Op-Ed, Beating Genocide in Iraq, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 5, 
2007, at A15 (“If Iraqis tell us that they would feel safer in religiously 
homogenous neighborhoods . . . we should support and protect them in their 
voluntary, peaceful evacuation.”). 
 117. Cf. RHODRI C. WILLIAMS, BROOKINGS INST., APPLYING THE LESSONS OF 
BOSNIA IN IRAQ: WHATEVER THE SOLUTION, PROPERTY RIGHTS SHOULD BE 
SECURED  (2008), available at http://www.brookings.edu/papers/2008/0108_ 
iraq_williams.aspx (relating one of Bosnia’s most important legacies, the general 
rule that “all those wrongfully displaced during the war had the right to return and 
reclaim their former homes and property,” to Iraq). 
 118. See Stephen Farrell, U.N. Readies ‘Grand Deal’ to Resolve Iraq’s Dispute 
over Kirkuk, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 21, 2008, at A10 (noting that UN officials left open 
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approach should therefore be carefully studied so that steps will be 
taken to mitigate the negative effects. 
3. Property and Compensation Mechanisms. 
To encourage the return of IDPs and refugees to their homes as 
well as enhance their ability to resettle elsewhere, it is crucial that 
effective property restitution or compensation mechanisms be 
established for those forced from their homes since 2003. 
For Iraqis who lost their land and property as a result of the 
policies of Saddam Hussein, mechanisms were created in 
cooperation with the Coalition Provisional Authority.119 These 
procedures need to be extended to those more recently displaced and 
improvements made in how they work. The processing of claims for 
the victims of Saddam Hussein has taken far too long. By the end of 
2007, the Commission for the Resolution of Real Property Disputes 
was able to decide only one-fourth of the claims submitted (some 
37,000 out of 135,000).120 There was also a low rate of enforcement. 
Other problems arose as well—people with informal or collective 
land claims (such as the Marsh Arabs) found little or no help in 
retrieving property; there was little legal clarity over whether 
damages to property were covered; and the requirement of formal 
documentation to prove ownership excluded too many claims, 
pointing to the need for more flexible interpretations and applications 
of the law.121
the possibility that population transfers may be recommended for Kirkuk, although 
noting that such a move would be contentious in the region). 
 119. See Peter Van der Auweraert, Presentation at U.S. Dep’t of State 
Symposium on Post Conflict Restitution in Arlington, Virginia (Sept. 6-7, 2007), 
available at http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/(http 
Documents)/48FF3C144E17CBBCC12573DB00500C96/$file/Property+Restitutio
n+in+Iraq+-+Peter+Van+der+Auweraert.pdf (examining the background and 
establishment of the CRRPD to address the property violations that occurred under 
Saddam’s regime). 
 120. Id. 
 121. See id. (noting the necessity for reconsideration of thousands of decisions 
after changes to the CRRPD law and that “a significant number of successful 
claimants face difficulties in having their CRRPD restitution decisions enforced”); 
see also Norbert Wuehler, Presentation at Conference on Internally Displaced 
Persons – An Ongoing Dialogue, The Amar International Charitable Foundation, 
London (Mar. 1-2, 2006). 
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Property specialist Rhodri Williams, who worked on claims in 
Bosnia for the U.N., recommends that the Iraqi authorities make an 
announcement that the appropriation and destruction of property 
since 2003 will be reversed through the use of legal remedies. Iraq, 
he says, should stand behind the provisions in its Civil Code, which 
specify that “true title does not pass with property acquired 
unlawfully; that transfers of property made under duress are invalid; 
and that those wrongfully dispossessed are entitled to the return of 
their property as well as compensation . . . .”122 Williams warns that 
the absence of a meaningful legal process of restitution in which 
hundreds of thousands are dispossessed could threaten long-term 
national and regional stability.123
In Bosnia, he notes, by 2004, families were able to reclaim 
approximately 200,000 abandoned homes, and as many as half of 
those displaced have returned to their former homes.124 At the same 
time, the Balkans experience shows that many refugees and IDPs do 
not return to their home areas unless their ethnic group is in the 
majority.125 Similarly, in Iraq, many of the refugees and IDPs may 
not return home, but being able to resolve their property claims may 
at least enable them to earn the means for reintegration elsewhere in 
the country. International organizations should be tapped to help set 
up such mechanisms in Iraq, in particular the “independent and 
impartial commission” called for in the government’s new National 
Policy on Displacement.126 The international community’s long 
experience with property claims and the lack of capacity and 
frequent politicizing of state institutions in Iraq make this essential. 
 122. Williams, supra note 117; see, e.g., CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] art. 135 (1951) 
(Iraq) (invalidating the disposal of property without the validation of the rightful 
owner); id. art. 114 (providing that contracts made under duress are void); id. art 
192 (requiring that usurped property be returned to its owner). 
 123. See Williams, supra note 117 (explaining that the “legacy of grievance and 
impoverishment” resulting from a lack of legal restitution remedies may pose a 
great “threat to long-term national and regional stability”). 
 124. Id. (underscoring that the reclaiming of property allowed refugees and IDPs 
to “get on with their post-war lives” by giving them economic autonomy). 
 125. See Deniz Sert, Property Rights in IDP Return and Resettlement (Feb. 
2008) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, City University of New York Graduate 
Center) (on file with author). 
 126. See Ministry Press Release, supra note 100 (announcing the participation 
of the United Nations and the international community in the new Iraqi National 
Policy to Address Displacement). 
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4. A  Viable Political System. 
The way Iraq evolves politically will heavily affect how 
displacement is addressed. The Bush Administration has by and large 
supported a unitary state as the best way of preventing Iraq from 
falling into chaos. The Shi’a led al-Maliki government, it believes, 
will ultimately transform itself into one of national unity.127 Others, 
however, argue that the only way to preserve a unified Iraq is by the 
development of a “loose federalism.” Vice-President-elect Joseph R. 
Biden, Jr., when chair of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 
called for a decentralized, federal state as the best political solution 
for Iraq.128 Author Peter Galbraith has gone further, arguing in favor 
of partition and pointing out that a loose confederation has already 
become “the reality on the ground.”129 The existence of an 
autonomous Kurdish north, a Shi’a region in the south, a Sunni 
enclave in the center and west, with a weak national government in 
Baghdad constitutes a form of partition, which Galbraith considers “a 
better outcome than a Sunni-Shiite civil war.”130 Such a war would 
lead to a Shi’a victory given the preponderance of Shi’a in the 
country and the strong potential influence of Iran. What is needed 
instead, Galbraith argues, is a blueprint for working out the borders 
of the three ethnic areas, an arrangement for the sharing of oil 
revenues, and a formula to share or divide Baghdad. Opponents of 
partition, however, consider the reality on the ground more complex. 
 127. Compare Peter W. Galbraith, The Surge, N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS, Mar. 15, 
2007, at 4 [hereinafter Galbraith, The Surge] (recognizing that “Bush’s strategy 
assumes that Iraq’s Shiite-led government can become a force for national unity”), 
with Charles Krauthammer, The Partitioning of Iraq, WASH. POST, Sept. 7, 2007, 
at A21 (arguing a weak partioned Iraq is not the best outcome and that it is “highly 
doubtful” that “[a] democratic, unified Iraq might someday emerge” through 
“ground-up reconciliation in the provinces”). 
 128. See Joseph R. Biden, Jr. & Leslie H. Gelb, Op-Ed., Federalism, Not 
Partition, WASH. POST, Oct. 3, 2007, at A23 (“[Our plan] would hold Iraq together 
by bringing to life the federal system enshrined in its constitution.  A federal Iraq is 
a united Iraq but one in which power devolves to regional governments, with a 
limited central government”). 
 129. See Peter W. Galbraith, Op-Ed, Make Walls, Not War, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 23, 
2007, at A29 (contending that the plan advocated by Biden/Brownback “is 
irrevocably becoming the reality on the ground” in Iraq). 
 130. See id. (“Let’s face it: partition is a better outcome than a Sunni-Shiite civil 
war.”).  See generally Galbraith, The Surge, supra note 127 (outlining the dangers 
attendant in an un-partitioned Iraq). 
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They point out that local militia leaders and sheiks have begun to 
control areas with shifting boundaries in which “Shi’a are often at 
odds with other Shi’a and Sunni at odds with other Sunni.”131 Any 
move to partition the country into three parts, these experts contend, 
will not only have little bearing on what now exists but will meet 
with substantial resistance. 
As of this writing, the Shi’a dominated government has been 
consolidating its strength over the center and south of the country. 
But whatever political system emerges, it should be in the interest of 
both the central and local authorities to initiate and carry forward 
programs to address the needs of internally displaced populations. 
Reintegrating IDPs is not only a humanitarian imperative but a 
strategic one. Large masses of people without the basic necessities of 
life are a threat to national as well as local security. 
5. Implementation of the National Policy to Address Displacement. 
Launched in July 2008, the policy sets forth the rights of the 
displaced and the government’s obligations toward these 
populations. It promises to ensure that IDPs are registered, can 
readily access basic services, obtain documentation, secure 
compensation for lost or damaged property, find employment and 
housing, receive pensions, and obtain assistance and legal aid when 
subject to human rights abuse.132 To promote its implementation, it 
will need to be reinforced by: 
• A comprehensive database to provide information about the 
needs of the displaced in all governorates, updated by regular 
countrywide assessments. 
• The setting up of consultation mechanisms to achieve a close 
working relationship with IDPs, local communities and NGOs 
in applying the policy. 
 
 131. See Thom Shanker, Op-Ed., Divided They Stand, But On Graves, N.Y. 
TIMES, Aug. 19, 2007, WK1 (quoting a deputy director at the International Crisis 
group warning “that Iraq ‘was not falling apart into two or three parts; the country 
risks total collapse’”). 
 132. See Ministry Press Release, supra note 100 (outlining the “need for 
coordination and cooperation between the different Ministries and the international 
community”). 
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• The active involvement and coordination of all relevant central 
and local government offices (e.g., displacement and migration, 
housing, health, education, finance, human rights and the 
judicial system) in implementing the policy and carrying out its 
recommendations. 
• The assignment to government offices of staff in sufficient 
numbers and with adequate training to carry out the policy and 
apply the principle of non-discrimination in so doing. 
• The training of police and military to protect displaced persons 
and humanitarian staff and hold accountable those involved in 
sectarian violence, forced displacement, the destruction of 
houses, the expropriation of land, and attacks on aid workers 
and their supplies. 
• The allocation of adequate resources, in particular a fixed 
percentage of oil revenues,  to address the needs of the 
displaced.133  The Iraqi Parliament has urged the government to 
allocate $1.5 billion for this purpose, and a parliamentary 
committee has recommended $4 billion.134 A substantial part of 
the funds should be given directly to displaced families, and 
resources should also be assigned to governorates, local 
communities and families hosting the displaced. Local NGOs 
should also be apportioned funds to build up their capacity in 
helping IDPs. 
• The setting up, in collaboration with the U.N., of property 
restitution and compensation mechanisms for those uprooted 
since 2003, with special attention paid to Kirkuk where 
property claims are becoming explosive and where mechanisms 
instituted now could prevent violence and more displacement 
 133. See Parliament Committee Demands Fixed Budget, supra note 28 (quoting 
the Iraqi Parliament’s Displacement and Migration Committee’s proposal that “3 
to 5 percent of national oil revenues should be allocated” for assistance to refugees 
and IDPs). 
 134. See Parliament Urges Government to Reallocate Development Money to 
Those in Need, IRIN, Apr. 13, 2008, http://www.irinnews.org/report.aspx? 
ReportId=77740 (quoting the head of the Iraqi Parliament’s anti-corruption 
committee,  advocating that the money “belongs to the Iraqi people and it must go 
to the Iraqi people”); and Iraq: Parliament demands financial help for IDPs, 
refugees, IRIN, Sept. 25, 2008, http://www.irinnews.org/Report.aspx?ReportId 
=80581. 
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later on. In addition, there should be more rigorous application 
of existing compensation laws applicable to claims prior to 
2003. 
• Evaluations of conditions for return throughout the country, 
and the setting up of special programs to help IDPs and 
refugees return or resettle once conditions are deemed safe and 
sustainable. Dialogue and reconciliation programs should be 
introduced in return areas, such as the joint rebuilding of 
houses and infrastructure by different ethnic and religious 
groups, and the strengthening of the judicial system to deal 
with issues of justice, reconciliation and human rights. 
CONCLUSION 
Absent a political accommodation among Shi’a, Sunnis and 
Kurds, the return and reintegration of most of Iraq’s displaced will be 
difficult to achieve. Although some steps have been taken on the 
political front,135 progress has been limited on the major issues—the 
sharing of oil revenues; the development of an effective national 
police able to deal with sectarian and tribal violence (there appears to 
be progress with respect to the army); the disbanding of local 
militias; the implementation of a more decentralized form of 
government; and a decision on the future status of Kirkuk. Without 
movement on these issues, large scale violence could potentially 
resume in different parts of the country with substantial deaths and 
the increased displacement of people. 
One clear test of whether Iraq will emerge as a functioning state is 
how it addresses the needs of the more than four million persons 
displaced inside the country and throughout the region. Government 
 135. See, e.g., Jason Gluck, From Gridlock to Compromise: How Three Laws 
Could Begin to Transform Iraqi Politics, United States Institute for Peace Briefing, 
May 2008, http://www.usip.org/pubs/usipeace_briefings/2008/0319_iraqi_politics 
.html (recognizing the importance of the amnesty law that would benefit Sunnis 
and a law aimed at better structuring the relationship between the central and 
provincial governments, including a compromise that grants seventeen percent of 
national revenues to the Kurdish regional government); ERIC OWLES, PODCAST: 
THE PROVINCIAL ELECTION LAW (N.Y. Times 2008), http://baghdadbureau.blogs. 
nytimes.com/2008/09/26/podcast-the-provincial-election-law/?hp (recognizing the 
impact of the provincial election law on increasing the representation of Sunnis in 
government). 
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action too often has been marred by sectarian preferences, a lack of 
urgency, and incompetence. The International Medical Corps has 
called for a “civilian surge” to develop the technical capacity and 
efficiency of the Iraqi government to deal with the humanitarian 
emergency.136 The urgency felt by the displaced and their supporters 
was expressed by the chair of an Iraqi coalition of NGOs who called 
upon the government “to shoulder the majority of the responsibility” 
for Iraq’s IDPs and refugees.137 The government’s new National 
Policy to Address Displacement, a welcome development, 
constitutes an important framework for addressing the needs of the 
displaced but it will require a great deal of national and international 
effort to implement its provisions, reinforced by greater portions of 
Iraq’s growing oil revenues. To date, the government has set aside 
only meager amounts of its $70 billion budget for 2008 for refugees 
and IDPs.138 Unless it is willing to tackle the humanitarian crisis 
inside the country and the refugee crisis and brain drain that it has 
caused, Iraq will not be able to work out effective responses to the 
larger issues of its internal stability and political future. 
The United States must fully acknowledge the special obligation it 
has toward Iraq’s displaced, since its actions have spawned the 
overall crisis in Iraq. Assuming this responsibility will mean working 
with the government of Iraq to support its development of programs 
for the safe and sustainable returns of most refugees and IDPs. It will 
also mean sharp increases in its own financial support for refugees 
and IDPs as well as a willingness to bring into the United States 
larger numbers of Iraqis and to mobilize a more generous 
international response. America will also have to pay greater 
attention to how security will be provided for civilians once the 
United States draws down its troop levels. It remains unclear how 
 136. See Concerned Over Crisis – International Medical Corps Calls for Long-
Term Assistance to Iraqis, INT’L MEDICAL CORPS, Apr. 14, 2008, 
http://www.imcworldwide.org/content/article/detail/1734/ (bemoaning a gap in the 
delivery of services that humanitarian aid workers could fill). 
 137. See More Government Money, supra note 28. 
 138. Compare Iraq: Government Incentives for IDPs, Refugees to Return, IRIN, 
June 3, 2008, http://www.irinnews.org/Report.aspx?ReportId=78532 (reporting 
that “the Iraqi government has allotted . . . $195 million to encourage [IDPs] and 
refugees to return to their homes), with Vote Brings Iraqi Budget to Record $70 
Billion, CNN.COM, July 8, 2008, http://www.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/meast/07/08/ 
iraq.main/index.html (noting that Iraq’s total 2008 budget is now $70 billion). 
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effectively Iraqi national police and army will be able to provide 
security for IDPs and returning refugees and contain radical militias 
should they resume propagating sectarian violence. This makes the 
option of an international or regional police force worth considering. 
U.N. envoy Sergio Vieira de Mello. while dying in the rubble of 
the Canal Hotel bombing in 2003, urged that the United Nations not 
leave Iraq. It is time for the world community to heed his appeal and 
play a more engaged role in the reconstruction and development of 
Iraq, the return and reintegration of its displaced populations and its 
movement toward a more politically sound future. 
 
